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Changes that are Driving Security Transformation
1. Holistic View of Security – world-wide 
terrorism; pandemics; weapons 
proliferation; rogue nuclear states; 
energy dependence; insurgencies
2. Technological Changes – Info. tech, 
biotech, nano-tech, robotics, high-
energy lasers, etc. 
3. Warfighting Changes - Netcentric 
Warfare; Asymmetric warfare (bio, 
cyber, IEDs); Systems-of-Systems; 
Joint and coalition operations
4. New Missions - Homeland defense; 
missile defense; counterinsurgency; 
stability and reconstruction
5. China - Future adversary or Econ. 
Competitor (or Global “Partner”)
6. Intelligence Changes - Integrated data; 
open-sources; Language and culture 
understanding
7. Unpredictability – Requiring agility, 
rapid responsiveness, broad-based 
capability
8. Industrial Changes - Horizontal & 
vertical integration; commercial 
high-tech advances  
9. Globalization - Rapid spread of 
Technology; multinational firms; 
foreign sourcing 
10. Isolationist Moves - “Buy-
American”; discourage foreign 
scholars and students
11. Defense Budget Shifts - From 
Equipment to Personnel, O&M and 
Homeland Security
12. Domestic Economics – Health care; 
demographics; debt; trade
13. Government Workforce - Aging; 
wrong skill mix; judgment vs. rules; 
managers vs. doers
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We Are At A Critical Point - -
¨ Similar to when Sputnik went up; or when the Cold 
War ended
¨ The Security world has changed dramatically - -
especially since 9/11/01 (geopolitically, 
technologically, threats, missions, warfighting, 
commercially, etc.).
¨However, the Defense Industrial Structure, the 
controlling policies, practices, laws, and the Services’
budgets and “requirements” priorities have not been 
transformed to match the needs of this new world.
The last two decades have seen a consolidation of the 20th
Century Defense Industry - - not a transformation to a 21st
Century Structure.
The last two decades have seen a consolidation of the 20th
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Assumptions for the Mid-21st Century
1. Declining real defense dollars (and perhaps no FY 09 Supplementals)
2. Continuing rapid technology changes 
3. Continued globalization of advanced technology and industry
4. Continued trends in the diverse nature of conflicts 
5. Far greater unpredictability of security needs
6. Current “Platforms”, and those under near-term production, will form the 
major fielded platforms for the next 20+ years 
7. “Services” will continue to grow (already 60%)
8. Intelligence and unmanned systems will receive greater focus
9. R&D Investments will shift to Netcentric-Relevant Architectures, 
Software, and C4ISR systems; which must be optimized as “systems-of-
systems”
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Current Situation
1. A fiscal crisis is coming (“hard decisions” will be 
required - - which will significantly affect industry, and 
will be strongly resisted by many).  R&D most 
vulnerable.
2. The DoD is well prepared for a conventional, high-
intensity war, but unprepared, and unable to rapidly 
shift to the needs of the “likely war” - - and likely 
conflicts are not simply subsets of the “big war” (as we 
found in Vietnam, Panama, Iraq, etc.).
3. Future adversaries are most likely to use non-traditional 
(“disruptive”/“asymmetric”) approaches against us 
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Current Situation (cont.)
4. The structure of industry and Current trends in DoD 
investments, do not match the projected 21st Century security 
needs.
– Frequently fails to access the best available technology to respond to DoD 
needs
– Lacks agility and flexibility and is often slow to respond to changes in 
missions and requirements
– Is seldom cost effective or successfully manages the cost/schedule of new 
programs
– Tends to be platform-centric, not network-centric
5. DoD now buys more services than hardware, yet its acquisition 
practices are hardware-focused and poorly suited to acquire 
services.
– The broad span of services need sophisticated, targeted acquisition 
strategies/approaches.  One size does not fit all.
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Current Situation (cont.)
6. Both DoD and the supporting industrial structure lack the skills (e.g. 
systems engineering, analysis, etc.) to do objective, independent design 
and optimization of the increasingly complex and interdependent 
systems-of-systems required to handle the likely 21st Century threats.
7. There has been a shift away from both DoD and Industrial funding of 
longer-term S&T; as well as from capital investments
8. Funding for competitive prototyping and logistics transformation is 
not available - - yet both areas are critical to future military 
effectiveness
9. While the industrial world (civil and military) has globalized, 
security legislation, policy, and practices have not adjusted (e.g. 
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Current Situation (cont.)
10. The mid-sized independent firms (e.g. $200M to $2B) are being 
acquired (further reducing competition and innovation)
– Contracts to mid-sized companies are down 40% over the past five years
– This squeeze on mid-sized companies encourages M&A activity and 
increasing concentration in a handful of very large companies.
– This deprives DoD of some of its most innovative and cutting edge 
technical support
– It also reduces the pressures on large companies to manage costs
11. There is less “disruptive” innovation coming from vertically-integrated, 
large firms and fewer incentives (encouragement) for it coming from the 
DoD (e.g. funded unsolicited proposals); and their acquired companies 
(small and medium sized) have tended to lose their innovation after the 
acquisition
12. Significant barriers exist for commercial firms, commercial products, and 
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Current Situation (cont.)
13. Based on statements (from government and industry) vertical 
integration (along with C.O.I.) has become a greater concern since the 
1997 DSB study of the subject (due to changes in industry structure 
and government acquisition practices e.g. LSI, TSPR)
14. The Defense Industry is considered (and treated as) a “mature”
industry when what is needed is a dynamic, agile, innovative, info-
based, 21st Century industry
15. For the industrial structure to change, it will require significant 
changes in the way the DOD does its business (from the 
“requirements process”, through the budget, acquisition, and support 
processes)
There is a clear need for a transformation of the U.S. 
Defense Industrial Base; and it is up to DoD to achieve it.
There is a clear need for a transfor ation of the U.S. 
Defense Industrial Base; and it is up to DoD to achieve it.
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Desired, Broad Characteristics of the Mid-21st
Century Security Industrial Base
1. Satisfies the Broad Range of Mid-21st Century National 
Security needs - - within the resources available
2. Technologically Advanced – to maintain a posture of 
“technological superiority” (in systems, and, systems-of-
systems - - both hardware, and software)
3. Innovative (in architectures, products, processes, and 
applications) - - with appropriate focus on “game 
changers” and prototype demonstrations
4. Agile, to meet major security “surprises;” and highly-
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Desired, Broad Characteristics of the Mid-21st
Century Security Industrial Base (cont.)
5. Resilient, to physical and cyber attacks (and other 
“vulnerabilities”)
6. Draws Fully on Commercial and Global Technologies
7. Lower Cost (through product and process design) - - to 
procure adequate quantities - - yet with continuous 
performance improvements
8. Highly competitive - - at all levels - - for innovation and 
cost benefits (i.e. “Best Value”)
9. Financially, Viable, to attract capital and investment (in 
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Specific Mid-21st Century Defense Industrial Base 
Requirements
1. Design teams in all critical areas- - through prototyping (not necessary to have 
production underway, but should have plans for production) 
2. Existence of a number of high-quality, competitive, and independent “systems 
architecture/engineering and software” firms - - who are willing to take 
“hardware exclusion contracts”
3. A “globalized defense market”- - technology transfer with allies and buying from 
the best - - with proper risk-based concern, regarding security
4. More small and medium-sized firms - - adequately funded and focused on 
competitive innovation (i.e. “open up” the defense industry; vertical 
“decentralization”)
5. Independent “red-teams”, to represent potential asymmetric options from 
adversaries (using modern, global technologies in reaction to our systems and 
solutions)
6. Network-Centric Industrial Operations - throughout the life cycle, and 
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For an Industrial Transformation, the DoD Must 
Transform Its Business Model
1. Achieve Lower Costs and Faster-to-Field, while still achieving better 
performance
2. Focus on “Staying Ahead”, by adequately funding “engines of Innovation”
3. Focus on Net-Centric Systems-of-Systems
4. Achieve far greater use of “Best Value” Competitions
5. Understand and Realize the Benefits of Globalization
6. Stress the Importance of a High-Quality, High-Skill Government 
Acquisition Workforce
7. Transform the DoD Logistics System to a Modern, World-Class 
Information-Based Supply-Chain
8. Envision, Monitor, Incentivize, and Achieve the desired 21st Century 
Industrial Structure (working with DHS and DNI)
The Suppliers will respond to the Transformation of 
its Customer.
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Example of Potential Incentives: Profit Policy
Take full advantage of current DFARS Guidelines that allow
added profit percentage for the following:
¨ “Cost Efficiency” (Factor 4, added in 2000)
– Reduction or elimination of excess facilities
– Cost reduction initiatives
– Incorporation of commercial items and processes
– Contractor investment in cost-reducing facilities
¨ “Technology Incentives” (Factor 1, added in 2000)
– For significant innovative changes that:
• Fundamentally reduce the costs or improve the reliability of existing 
products
• For new products, that fundamentally reduce the costs or improve the 
reliability of the products they replace
May 16, 2007
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One Organizational Change That Could Have a Significant Positive
Impact in a number of areas would be to Change the designation of the 
DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) :
¨Make the current USD (AT&L) the CIO [which meets 
the requirements of Clinger-Cohen and of Goldwater-
Nichols - - which are now in conflict]
¨ Put the Asst. Secretary (Networks and Information 
Integration) under the USD, and change the USD title (to 
IAT&L) - - this would emphasize the importance of 
information-centric systems, both for warfare and for 
infrastructure 
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For an Industrial Transformation, There Must a 
DoD Business Transformation
 DoD and Congress must shift from a posture of “maximum risk 
avoidance” (through over-regulation, protection, etc.) to an 
objective of effective and efficient acquisition management
 The “model” should be a Government/Industry Partnership, in a 
continuously competitive market, striving for an industry that is 
flexible, adaptive, agile, innovative, low-cost, high-quality, and 
satisfies 21st Century security needs
 The semi-annual CEO meetings, with the Sec. Def./Dep. Sec. 
Def. and Service Chiefs, should be reintroduced
Strong Leadership is required to overcome the 
expected institutional resistance - - this must be a high 
priority, or it will not happen!
Strong Leadership is required to overco e the 
expected institutional resistance - - this ust be a high 
priority, or it will not happen!
May 16, 2007
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On Making Change in Government
May 16, 2007
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1. DoD to Focus on Net-Centric Systems-of-Systems
 Shift resources (from platforms) to provide adequate funding and top people to 
optimize the complete systems-of-systems, within available resources - - with full 
recognition of the “complexity” of such systems-of-systems
 Require a government “systems architecture/engineering manager” on each major 
program; and provide experienced government Program Management and Systems 
Engineering oversight capability on systems-of-systems (a la FCS) - - establish the 
intent to do this in RFP
 Utilize a “systems architecture/engineering firm” to support the government and 
independently optimize the systems-of-systems (with hardware and software 
exclusions to avoid conflicts-of-interest)
 Make “interoperability” a KPP, (and ensure it is fully tested on a system-of-systems 
basis, and within cost constraints).  [Interoperability is not primarily a technical 
issue, it is a governance issue.]
 Establish small “Red Teams” (government and/or industry) to independently attempt 
to counter systems with globally-available technology
 Budget and program based on mission “capabilities portfolio management” (e.g. 
Battlespace awareness; joint command and control; etc.)
May 16, 2007
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2.)  DoD Must Focus on Achieving Lower Costs and Faster-
to-Field (while still achieving better performance)
¨ “Requirements” Changes
¨ Acquisition Process Changes
¨ Budget Process Changes
¨ Logistics Process Changes
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2. DoD must Focus on Achieving Lower Costs and Shorter 
Cycles (while still achieving better performance)
 Change the “requirements” process, so costs and schedule are part of a systems analysis 
effort that precedes a firm set of “requirements” from the JROC (in which cost and 
schedule are firm i.e. unit cost fixed and “time-defined” acquisitions)
 Utilize “experimentation”, with user feedback, on prototypes (hardware and software) to 
establish “firm requirements” for new systems and subsystems
 Utilize a true “spiral development” process for all weapons systems (based on proven 
technology and with a 5 year cycle for Block I, from milestone B to I.O.C.); with the 
option of competition (prime and/or subsystem) at each block (depending on 
performance and cost results from prior block); and with R&D always being funded for 
subsequent blocks
 Budget Programs to realistic costs and schedules (e.g. ICA’s) 
 Ensure ability of the government’s Program Manager to make 
cost/schedule/performance trades on  each Block, with the approval of the USD (AT&L) 
and lead Service Chief (or the VCJCS),  without going back to the JROC
 Create, and adequately fund, a “Rapid Fielding Organization”; (using current programs 
and funds) [ref. DSB 2006 Summer Study]
 Achieve “Enterprise Integration” of information systems across DoD and between DoD 
and Industry (at all levels) [The role of the Defense Transformation Agency.]
May 16, 2007
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3. DoD must Focus on “Staying Ahead”
 Increase S&T (especially research) budgets; and focus a significant share on 
“disruptive” architectures and technologies (i.e. “game changers” – including 
prototype, users demonstrations.
 Set up a new R&D Funding Source:
¾ “Disruptive Systems Demonstrations” (under DDR&E)
¾ Use 6% of the RDT&E budget (≈$4B/yr)
¾ Limit to mid-sized firms (and allow some by independent Divisions of Large 
Firms)
¾ Take through field demos by SOCOM (or Rapid Fielding Org.)
¾ Use OTA and no formal “requirements”
¾ Aim for low-cost, and rapid fielding
 Return to separate (from B&P) industrial IR&D programs (does not require 
legislation) with appropriate government oversight and reporting. - - encourage dual-
use technology
 Establish higher limits on size and amounts of DoD small business awards (e.g. SBIR) 
to encourage more small business firms to contribute to the innovation from DoD’s 
S&T program: include a product-cost/manufacturing orientation; and, an S&T funded 
Phase IIB or III.
May 16, 2007
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4. DoD Must Achieve far greater use of “Best 
Value” Competitions
 With the primary objective of innovation; and, secondarily, cost savings - - at both 
prime and critical lower tier elements
 Not a firm requirement (beyond the competitive prototype phase) as long as current 
producer is continuously improving performance and lowering costs - - but a credible 
option must always be present
 An inexpensive way to maintain the option is a second source funded for 
interchangeable, next-generation, lower cost/higher performance prototype (system or 
subsystem)
 Require “open architectures” on all systems (to encourage continuous competition for 
upgrades, and evolution in “system-of-systems architectures”).
 Encourage FAR Part 12/ O.T.A use at lower tiers to bring in commercial suppliers
 Discourage Vertical Integration by awarding extra points in RFP for analysis of 
make/buy decisions by prime (with detailed comparisons shown of alternatives 
considered)
 Develop, and fully utilize new regulations and practices that focus on procurement of 
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5. DoD Must Understand and Realize the Security  
Benefits of Globalization
 Coalition Operations will be the norm (for geopolitical reasons) so we 
must share technologies and train together
 Aggressively pursue tools and techniques to check COTS software
 Need is for “National Sovereignty” and Military Superiority - - foreign 
“dependency” need not mean “vulnerability”
 Significant Changes must be made in the ITAR, Export Controls, Berry 
Amendment, specialty metals, etc. to recognize the global defense 
market (with appropriate risk-based consideration of security and 
vulnerability concerns)
DoD must actively take the lead with State, Commerce, and 
Congress in this critically-important (but politically difficult) 
security area.
DoD must actively take the lead with State, Commerce, and 




NPS Acquisition Symposium ~ Monterey California
6. Stress the Importance of a High-Quality, High-
Skill, Government Acquisition Workforce
¨ Be competitive with industry for the “best and the brightest”
¨ Develop and implement a training and career development program 
for government civilians (comparable to the military’s program)
¨ Encourage industry-to-government and government-to-industry 
rotations
¨ Stress program systems engineering, production, support management 
skills (i.e. all “inherently governmental positions”)
¨ Recognize that government is moving from the “doers” to the 
“manager of the doers”
¨ For all positions that are not inherently-government, these 
“industrial/commercial” should be subjected to “competitive 
sourcing” (between public and private sectors - - to achieve higher 
performance at lower costs
In this new security environment, the acquisition management challenges 
are far greater and the government must have the top people to achieve 
success.
In this new security environment, the acquisition management challenges 
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7. Transform the DoD Logistics System to a Modern, 
World-Class, Information-Based Supply Chain
 The logistics system not only is the most expensive of the DoD acquisition 
processes, but it is the most critical for sustained warfighting.
 Yet, today, it is far from world-class (response is measured in weeks vs. hours; and 
there is little real asset visibility - - in spite of the high costs)
 The DoD must shift from a “supply push” system to a “demand pull” system based 
on “sense and respond” and secure I.T. (for “total asset visibility”)
 Utilize performance-based-logistics or warranties on all systems (legacy and new) to 
drive up availability, while lowering support costs - - and, if the trends don’t match 
these needs (on performance or costs), then be prepared to compete the support.
 Set up a new R&D Funding Source:
¾ “Logistics Transformation Implementations” (under TRANSCOM)
¾ Use 1% of current support budget (≈ $900M/yr)
¾ Make maximum use of commercial systems and software
¾ Objective is dramatic improvements in readiness and responsiveness at 
significantly lower costs
“We Can Not Achieve a DoD Transformation without a DoD Logistics 
Transformation”*
*(General Rick Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (years)
“We Can Not Achieve a DoD Transformation without a DoD Logistics 
Transformation”*
*(General Rick Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (years)
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8. DoD Must Envision, Monitor, Incentivize and Achieve a 21st
Century Industrial Base Structure (working with DHS and DNI)
 Changes in acquisition practices (e.g. cost accounting, etc) to encourage civil-
military industrial integration (at the plant level)
 Remove barriers to commercial firms (e.g. CAS) and encourage their participation 
(via OTA, FAR Part 12, etc.)
 Changes in “profit and overhead policy” to encourage the structural shifts, capital 
investments, lower cost initiatives, and incentives-for-entry by new and commercial 
firms 
 Incentives for Reduced Vertical Integration (e.g. insight info) Increased government 
oversight of make-vs.-buy decisions by large prime contractors (a la F.C.S. P.M. role 
in prime’s make-buy process)
 Assure strong, independent systems architecture/engineering firms
 Work with NIST to establish standards, (interfaces, not “common systems”) protocols, 
security procedures, etc. to allow, and require, full network-centric (i.e. I.T.-based, 
enterprise-wide) industrial operations - - in all phases of the life cycle and at all times, and 
between government and all tiers of industry
 At least every three years, perform a detailed “sectoral analysis” of each critical 
sector of the defense industrial base (including a focus on the ability to have R&D 
competition in each sector, and including the potential for civil-military integration 
and for a global marketplace)
